The long-running dispute between the Federal Government of Somalia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has resurfaced sharply following Somaliland’s rejection of Mogadishu’s claims over the port of Berbera, and Jubaland’s refusal to comply with a federal cabinet decision annulling port and investment agreements with the UAE.
- •The parallel pushback by Somaliland and Jubaland highlights Somalia’s unresolved internal governance fractures as well as the limits of federal authority over trade, investment and infrastructure deals.
- •Separately supported by Egypt and Saudi Arabia on one side, and the UAE and Israel on the other, for different reasons, Mogadishu and Hargeisa's growing escalation over sovereignty is bound to have far-reaching implications both internally and among its neighbours.
- •A deterioration in federal-state relations risks weakening coordination at a time when Kenya remains exposed to cross-border security threats and refugee pressures.
At the centre of the dispute is Somalia’s assertion that it retains sovereign authority over agreements concluded by Somaliland, which declared independence in 1991 but remains internationally unrecognized. Somaliland authorities argue that Somalia has neither jurisdiction nor effective control over its territory, and that agreements signed with the UAE, including port development and logistics infrastructure at Berbera, remain unlawful and binding. Berbera is operated by DP World, the Dubai-based ports operator, under agreements that have previously drawn objections from Mogadishu.
A deterioration in federal-state relations risks weakening coordination at a time when Kenya remains exposed to cross-border security threats and refugee pressures.
The tension is not confined to Somaliland. Jubaland, a federal member state controlling the strategically located Kismayo port, has publicly rejected Somalia’s federal cabinet decision purporting to annul agreements with the UAE. Jubaland argues that both its own constitution and Somalia’s provisional constitution grant federal member states authority over trade, investment and infrastructure within their jurisdictions, asserting that only Jubbaland can amend or terminate such contracts. This position reflects a broader constitutional ambiguity in Somalia’s federal system, where the division of powers between Mogadishu and federal member states remains contested more than a decade after the adoption of the provisional constitution.
The roots of the Somalia-UAE feud extend beyond ports. Relations deteriorated sharply after 2017, when Somalia declined to align with the Saudi-UAE bloc during the Gulf diplomatic crisis involving Qatar. Since then, Mogadishu has increasingly framed Emirati engagement with Somaliland and federal member states as an infringement on Somalia’s sovereignty, while the UAE has maintained that it operates through legally binding commercial agreements with competent local authorities. The seizure of Emirati funds at Mogadishu airport in 2018 and the subsequent scaling back of UAE security cooperation further strained ties.
The situation has now evolved with the widening rift in the broader Arab world, with Saudi Arabia and its allies pushing against the UAE's growing influence, and Israel's recent recognition of Somaliland's sovereignty. The rift is evolving into a regional pushback that cuts from the Sudan war to the conflict in Yemen.
Why it Matters
For Kenya, the implications are tangible but bounded. First, continued instability in Somalia’s federal relations complicates regional trade integration efforts under IGAD and the African Continental Free Trade Area, particularly where port access, customs coordination and cross-border logistics are concerned.
Escalating rhetoric over port sovereignty places pressure on regional states to avoid being drawn into Somalia’s internal disputes while safeguarding their own commercial and security partnerships.
Kenya has its own strategic interests in the Horn, including the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor, which is designed to position Lamu as a competitive alternative gateway for regional trade. Prolonged disputes around Berbera and Kismayo could reshape cargo routing and investment flows in ways that indirectly affect Lamu’s competitiveness.
Furthermore, Kenya’s security interests are closely tied to political cohesion in southern Somalia. Jubaland borders Kenya, and tensions between Jubaland and Mogadishu have in the past complicated joint security against Al-Shabaab. A deterioration in federal-state relations risks weakening coordination at a time when Kenya remains exposed to cross-border security threats and refugee pressures.
Kenya maintains working and commercial relations with Somalia’s federal government, Somaliland authorities, and Gulf partners including the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
Ultimately, the Somaliland and Jubaland responses highlight a structural reality: Somalia’s federal settlement remains incomplete, and external commercial and state actors are operating with that ambiguity. For Kenya, this emphasizes the importance of reinforcing regional dialogue, as well as advancing its own infrastructure and trade agenda in a way that is resilient to political volatility across the Horn of Africa.
