This also holds true for most African countries.
After the success of M-PESA in Kenya, banks in other countries quickly became aware of the existential threat that mobile money posed to them.
For instance, in Nigeria, where thebanks lead mobile money and not the telcos— adoption has suffered. This because telcos have much more robust distribution mechanisms than banks do and play in the digital space natively.
Where telcos are not incentivised significantly, mobile money will typically see slower uptake than in countries where they are.
Banks are playing catch-up in a war that they are doomed to lose as long as the African consumer meets the telco first.
At the same time, telcos still have a lot to learn from banks about managing people’s money. Considering these realities, coupled with retrogressive regulation around both telecoms and finance in African countries, isn’t it only reasonable for African banks and telcos to stop beingseparate things?
At first glance, the notion may seem absurd but I believe it’s the most efficient way that players in both industries can grow exponentially.
A strange new world
Think about it this way: the mobile phone stopped being just a communication device years ago.
Prepaid airtime was thefirst digital pseudo-currency to take the continent by storm. Despite multiple instances of people using airtime to facilitate money transfers, telcos never viewed airtime as a financial service mechanism.
Instead, they focused on growing their core communications business and strengthening mobile internet infrastructure.
The end result is that African telcos now have the experience and means to reach millions of people through their devices whose utility is increased everyday by the telco adding additional services.
The value of a phone and SIM card to the African consumer increases every time utility is added, and the distribution effort on the part of the telco for increased utility is usually negligible because services are consumed on a digital device.
On the other hand, banks don’t enjoy such a luxury — their customers do not possess a mechanism or device for the consumption of their services on apurely digitalplane.
A bank debit or credit card is the thing that comesclosestto what telcos have but still does not offer the sameutility(and thereforevalue) as a SIM card does. It’s only good for moving money.
Banks could, hypothetically, come up with a newthingthat they own and sell to people to enable them to consume their services digitally, but that thing would be dependent on connectivity infrastructure and in most African countries, that infrastructure is owned by telcos.
It’s hard to win.
The banks’ chance to fight back?
On the flipside, telcos just aren’t very good at moving money around.
Mobile money works for most use cases, but the moment you need to do a large number of transactions or move around a larger sum of money, its limitations quickly start to show.
Most mobile money accounts have a daily transaction limit and maximum account balance — much unlike bank accounts. I imagine this is because the mobile network operators still need to back funds held electronically with an equivalent in a bank and do not wish to risk exceeding storing more value than they can back.
International remittances are an even bigger problem as banks own the best and most reliable mechanisms for moving money around the globe, like SWIFT wire transfers for example.
The global financial system relies heavily on banks and the agreements between them, and no matter how hard telcos try, they’ll never be able to get a seat at that table.
Now then, given how many people in Africa are still excluded from the formal financial system and still don’t own a mobile phone, an ideal logical solution would be to combine the strengths of these two industries and create anew thingthat is neitherexclusivelybanknortelco but solvescommunicationandmoney managementthroughonemechanism.
Of course, this would mean collapsing the idea of each of these industries existing on their own and that would lead to a lot of money lost for a lot of important people — resistance is natural and expected.
The first clear example I’ve seen of this new type of industry in Africa came in 2015 with the launch ofEquitelin Kenya — a bank-led virtual telco that introduced thin-SIM cards that you could overlay over your existing SIM card to gain banking functionality on mobile.
In this way, the bank is able to leverage the telco’s infrastructure to reach customers.
Equitel was met with heavy resistance from Safaricom — the leading mobile money operator at the time with M-PESA. It appears they were right to do so asEquitel has eaten significantly into their market share.
While we are yet to see many such upheavals, the symbiotic relationship between telephony and finance becomes ever more clear as time progresses.
Newer entrants in the space such asBibiMoney, want to push the boundaries even further by offering thin-SIM technology that is telco and country agnostic — selling their solution to banks who would want to ride mobile infrastructure to drive financial inclusion.
It’s still unclear to me what exactly this future will look like but it’s now apparent that mobile technology is a powerful distribution mechanism for both banks and telcos alike.
The problem with the current mobile banking/mobile money models in place now is that they all seek to undercut the other player. Telcos go over-the-top of banks by providing mobile money and banks go over-the-top of telcos with thin SIMs.
As a result of this, a lot of time and energy is expended by either party trying to defend against over-the-top threats from the other.
If the technology continues to evolve at the rate it has, this problem will only be exacerbated. Throughout the history of time, incumbents have resisted inevitable technological change only to be annihilated by disruption.