China’s pledge to scrap tariffs on all African exports flatters the continent with a promise few are equipped to seize.
Middle low-income nations in the continent (like Kenya) may celebrate these pacts as ‘origins of economic transformation’, but without factories humming day and night, churning out immense quantities of goods worth buying, duty-free access to the Chinese market is a gilded door leading to an empty warehouse.
The trade imbalance between Africa and Beijing remains unscaleable. The Chinese pocket a US$62 billion trade surplus with the continent and it is highly unlikely that levelling the field is going to change anything. Last year, Kenya exported commodities worth KSh 26.3 billion to China; recording a 9% drop from 2023. This was lower than the volumes of commodities Kenya exported to the US (KSh 89 billion) and the European Union (KSh 157 billion).
In contrast, Chinese exports to Kenya rose by 25.5% to KSh 576 billion in 2024, retaining its dominance since the start of this century’s third decade. This is a reality that many pundits have lamented over for many years but to believe that the imbalance could be narrowed now is at best wishful. China outruns our productive capacities in exponential ways and no handshake in Beijing will teach us to sprint.
Africa makes little and has long forgotten how to make more. Manufacturing adds just 10.6% to its overall GDP, behind Asia’s 14% and Latin America’s 17%. Despite holding nearly 20% of the world’s people and land, the continent produces only a meagre 2% of global manufacturing, with most of it from North African domain, while the rest trail behind with rust and void ambition.
On the flip side, China churns out nearly a third of the world’s manufactured goods — satisfying its populous domestic demand and facing overcapacity problems. Since its WTO baptism in 2001, the country’s factories have roared to US$4.658 trillion in output by 2023, with exports swelling fivefold. China’s industrial machine is flooding global markets and padding a record trade surplus of US$992.2 billion.
On the agricultural front, one may adopt a little optimism since Africa’s productive abilities are slightly better on this front because the material costs are not as intensive as manufacturing. The continent’s arable lands remain vast but underutilized due to a despicable lag in mechanization and technology. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), extreme climate events have reduced agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa by 34% since 1961. With little scientific research and investment happening in the continent, the continent can barely mitigate this deterioration.
Kenya’s agricultural exports to China are mainly Avocados and Macadamia nuts. In 2023, Kenya’s macadamia exports ballooned from under 400 metric tons to more than 7,500 metric tons. China’s domestic production of the crop still outpaces Kenya’s — despite slipping from 62,500 metric tons to 56,000 metric tons in the same period. This year, the value of Macadamia production is set to plummet due to an overarching ban on the export of unprocessed nuts and the fluctuating prices of the commodity.
Avocados are not very popular in China, exemplified by a 80% plummet in the fruit’s export in the first seven months of 2024. Kenya’s export volumes fell to 742,934 kilograms, according to China Customs data. Our largest market of avocados is in Europe and the global demand remains under brutal competition from Mexico and Peru.
The points raised here are not mere indictments opposing the removal of the tariffs (I am not against that) but a reproach of the glee with which it has been received. This is not the first time China is scaling back trade barriers for African countries in attempts to solidify diplomatic ties or ramp up development status. In any case, individual countries have often sought favorable concessions.
The principal focus should instead be: Can we leverage these opportunities? Unfortunately, plenty of opportunities have swept past Africa unutilized. Trade pacts may promise access, but without sound domestic policies, functioning energy and logistical infrastructure, or a serious attempt at scaling production, they remain tidy documents gathering dust in ministerial drawers.
Until African governments concern themselves less with signing deals and reciting their putative benefits to the media; occupying themselves more with building the means to exploit them, such openings will remain academic notes for speeches and summits.
